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Kaplan’s Three Monsters 
	
	
David	 Kaplan’s	 discussion	 of	 monsters	 is	 confined	 to	 section	 VII	 of	
Demonstratives	 (Kaplan	 1977:	 510-2).	 The	main	 thesis	 of	 that	 section,	 namely	
that	 monsters	 do	 not	 occur	 in	 English	 and	 ‘could	 not	 be	 added	 to	 it’,	 has	
notoriously	 proved	 contentious. 1 	Still,	 this	 controversy	 has	 proceeded	 in	
apparent	ignorance	of	the	fact	that	Kaplan	fails	to	provide	a	univocal	definition	of	
a	 monsters,	 and	 vacillates	 between	 at	 least	 three	 non-equivalent	 alternatives.	
The	aim	of	this	note	is	that	of	disentangling	Kaplan’s	equivocation.	After	a	brief	
summary	of	Kaplan’s	framework	and	notation	in	section	one,	I	discuss	monsters	









a	 time.	 In	 a	 customary	 notation	 (modulo	 the	 avoidance	 of	 subscripts	 for	
legibility’s	 sake),	 the	 semantic	 value	 of	 e	 with	 respect	 to	 a	 context	 c	 and	 a	
circumstance	<w,	t>	is	[[e]](c,	w,	t).2	
The	fundamental	semantic	role	for	c	is	revealed	by	the	interpretive	clauses	for	
































of	 intensional	 operators,	 modulo	 the	 substitution	 of	 context-sensitivity	 with	
circumstance-sensitivity.	 So,	 just	 as	 the	 intensional	 operator	 ‘never’	 could	 be	








Here,	 the	 intuitively	 correct	 outcomes	 could	 be	 obtained	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	
monster-friendly	 treatment	 by	 interpreting	 ‘never’	 as	 ‘never’	 in	 (4),	 thereby	





expressions.	 (For	 instance,	 by	 definition	 (3),	 ‘never	 P’	 is	 truec	 iff	 [[never	








...	which	when	prefixed	 to	 a	 sentence	 yields	 a	 truth	 if	 and	only	 if	 in	








of	 speaking,	 and	 that	 the	 character	 for	 ‘tomorrow’	 picks	 out	 the	 following	 day	 (and	 tacitly	
transforming	(5)	into	a	declarative	sentence	for	simplicity’s	sake).		
5	Thanks	to	Roberto	Loss	for	calling	my	attention	to	this	passage.	




Obviously,	 the	 context	 shifter	 ‘never’	 from	 section	 two	 and	 the	 newly	








not	 only	 non-indexical	 but	 also	 perfect	 (in	 Kaplan’s	 sense,	 Kaplan	 1977:	 503).	
This	 is	 unsurprising,	 since	 the	 evaluation	 of	 non-indexical	 perfect	 sentences	






calling	 the	 reader’s	 attention	 to	 ‘operators	 which	 attempt	 to	 operate	 on	
character’	 (Kaplan	 1977:	 510).	 According	 to	 Kaplan,	 the	 character	 {e}	 of	 an	
expression	e	 is	 a	 function	which,	 given	a	 context	c,	 yields	 the	content	 {e}(c),	 in	
turn	 understood	 as	 a	 function	 which,	 given	 a	 circumstance	 <w,	 t>,	 yields	 the	
semantic	 value	 [[e]](c,w,t)	 (Kaplan	1977:	 546-8).	 As	 graphically	 highlighted	by	
the	 lack	 of	 arguments	 for	 {e},	 character	 is	 a	 primitive	 semantic	 property	 of	 an	
expression,	 a	 fact	 that	 justifies	 Kaplan	 to	 speak	 of	 character	 as	 the	 formal	
counterpart	of	‘meaning’.	
Since	 character	 is	 semantically	 primitive,	 the	 idea	 of	 (non-trivial)	 operators	
on	character	informally	provoke	a	sort	of	‘meaning	change’,	one	unobjectionably	
expressible	 in	 English	 only	 with	 the	 appeal	 of	 pure	 quotation.	 (Note	 in	 this	
respect	Kaplan’s	parenthetical	qualification	of	his	ban	on	monsters:	‘I	claim	that	
[none]	 can	 be	 expressed	 in	 English	 (without	 sneaking	 in	 a	 quotation	 device)’,	
Kaplan	 1979:	 511).	 In	 this	 sense,	 since	 all	 expressions	 are	 endowed	 of	 a	














A	 variety	 of	 phenomena	 have	 been	 alleged	 to	 present	 counterexamples	 to	
Kaplan’s	thesis	that	monsters	do	not	play	a	role	in	natural	language	semantics—
attitude	 predicates	 (Schlenker	 2003),	 fictional	 prefixes	 (Predelli	 2008),	 and	
issues	 in	 the	 vicinity	 of	 quotation	 (Recanati	 2001)	 being	 cases	 in	 point.	 Yet,	
Schlenker’s	 indirect	 reports	 involve	 context-shifters,	 Predelli’s	 prefixes	 fairly	
explicitly	 behave	 as	 global-shifters,	 and	Recanati’s	 considerations	 are	 arguably	
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